We provide a systematic assessment of the empirical evidence on the use and effectiveness of top executive dismissal as a governance and performance improvementmechanism. Our results suggest that poor individual and firm performance significantly increase the likelihood of executive dismissal. A strong power basemight help under-performing top executives to extend their tenure in office but effective ownership and governance structures can provide a counterweight to such entrenchment behaviors. However our review casts doubt on the effectiveness of top executive dismissal as a means to enhance future firmperformance: employing meta-analytical techniques we show that although the dismissal announcement leads to positive abnormal returns it has no significant effect on long-term measures of firm performance. On the basis of our findings we develop a conceptual model of the possible antecedents and consequences of top executive dismissal. We derive implications for boards involved in situations of executive dismissal and for the successors of dismissed executives and we provide directions for future leadership research on executive dismissal.